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Abstract: Responses to insurgency include both a large-scale societal reform directed at improving the lives of
civilians and a direct military response with no additional programs to improve civilian welfare. In this paper,
we ask, what is the optimal combination of aid and military response from the viewpoint of the state? Using a
computationalmodel, we evaluatewhatmix of these two strategies helps the government defeat an insurgency
more quickly. Our model yields that aidmay boost amilitary strategy that avoids civilian casualties, but it may
not compensate for a military strategy that targets civilians indiscriminately.
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Introduction
1.1 As the United States continues to find itself engaged in military action against non-state actors in places such
as Afghanistan and Syria, understanding the eectiveness of alternative strategies available to insurgents and
counterinsurgents remains an important area of study. Policymakers (Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012;
Nagl 2002; Petraeus 2006; Sepp 2005; Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual. FM 3-24.
MCWP 3-33.5 2006) and academics (Berman et al. 2011, 2013; Galula 2006 [1964]) agree that a government’s
peaceful interaction with the population is critical in defeating insurgency. Such observers fear that govern-
ments can be their own worst enemies when they use violence indiscriminately to try to defeat an insurgency.
The advocates of a more peaceful approach emphasize that providing security and aid to the population will
increase the support of communities for the government rather than insurgents. But while governments may
understand that providing aid to a population in order to sway popular sentiment is a good idea, doing somay
be expensive and diicult under violent conditions. And in practice, even proponents of an aid strategy ac-
knowledge that some military action to stop insurgents will be necessary when those insurgents are engaging
in eective violence. The US government explicitly notes that both military and economic means will be nec-
essary to defeat insurgency (Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual. FM 3-24. MCWP
3-33.5 2006, p. 1–11). However, while we understand that states must mix aid and military strategies, it is less
well-understood how dierent mixtures of these strategies might succeed or fail at defeating an insurgency. If
establishing security and providing public goods are both important in defeating an insurgency, then what is
their relative contribution to achieving thedesiredoutcome for the government? In practical terms, howshould
states allocate their finite resources when designing counterinsurgency campaigns?
1.2 Two findings in the counterinsurgency literature suggest desired elements of a successful counterinsurgency
strategy. First, counterinsurgency campaigns that target civilians indiscriminately increase support for insur-
gency among civilians (e.g., Condra & Shapiro 2012). Second, small-budget, well-designed, local aid programs
that improve civilians’ lives increase support for the state among civilians (e.g., Berman et al. 2013).1 Based on
these findings, a reasonable counterinsurgencycampaignwouldavoid targetingciviliansandwouldprovideaid
to civilians. Governments frequently face constraints on the total resources available for providing aid or for de-
velopingprecisely-targetedmilitary campaigns. This leadsus to ask: what is aneectivebalancebetween these
approaches? Could suicient investment in one strategy overcome the lack of investment in another strategy?
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And in particular, this paper asks whether it is possible for a state to use well-designed local aid programs to
compensate for a military strategy that targets civilians.
1.3 One cannot draw a direct comparison between the military and aid approaches from observational data, be-
cause the availability of sample data is not suicient to support a parametric analysis. We thus employ a com-
putational model to evaluate the relative contribution of these approaches to ending insurgency, using Ben-
nett’s (2008) computationalmodel of early stages of insurgency as a starting point. Given the focus on the early
stages of insurgency, most civilians are initially undecided about supporting insurgents. The insurgents’ goal is
to grow the insurgency and the state goal is to defeat it. Rebels succeed if an insurgency survives to become es-
tablished. Themodel conceptualizes insurgency as irregular warfare, a situation inwhich the rebels areweaker
than the government in the beginning of the conflict and engage in sporadic attacks rather than a sustained
conventional military campaign (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010, p. 418). Bennett (2008) tracks how civilians react to
soldiers employing military tactics of various designs against insurgents. In particular, his model focuses on
how soldiers’ ability to avoid harming bystanders and to capture targeted insurgents contribute to the overall
statemission of defeating a rebellion (Bennett 2008, 1.6). The simulation establishes that soldiers, who capture
targets and avoid collateral damage at least 40%of the time, defeat nascent insurgencies rapidly. By contrast, if
soldiers capture targets and avoid collateral damage 30% of the time or less, an insurgency spreads across the
population and, in some cases, becomes sustainable. The model illustrates how militaries alienate civilians,
inadvertently helping the rebellion, if they injure civilians and/or fail to capture targets.2
1.4 Since Bennett’s (2008) model explores the eects of the military approach, it may not answer the questions
posed in this project. We thus extend Bennett’s (2008)model by allowing both state and insurgent actors to use
aid in addition to military means. In our model, individual soldiers and insurgents may provide aid to civilians
as an alternative to attacking their opponents. We then trace how civilians react to the interaction of state and
insurgent actors employing military tactics against each other and providing aid to civilians. Our model yields
that aid may boost a military strategy that avoids civilian casualties, but it may not compensate for a military
strategy that targets civilians indiscriminately, emphasizing the paramount importance of a military approach
that relies on intelligence and avoids civilian casualties.
Two Broad Approaches to Counterinsurgency
2.1 Counterinsurgency (COIN) includes military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions
by a government designed to defeat an armed movement by a nonstate opponent aimed at the overthrow or
territorial change of an incumbent government (Counterinsurgency: TheU.S. Army/Marine Corps FieldManual.
FM 3-24. MCWP 3-33.5 2006, pp. 1–1). Military and paramilitary means may be viewed as a direct approach that
aims to physically eliminate or neutralize the rebels citepnagl2002. We refer to this as the military approach
to counterinsurgency. In contrast, political, economic, psychological, and civic measures may be grouped to-
gether as an indirect approach designed to improve the welfare of civilians beyond security concerns, thus
winning their hearts andminds and turning civilians away from the insurgency (Nagl 2002). We label this as the
aid approach.
2.2 What is the military approach? The military strategy relies on “stick” operations of violence, e.g., detention
and elimination of individual insurgents, disruption of insurgent support networks, and decapitation of insur-
gent organizations (U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide 2009, pp. 14–15). It is a kinetic component of a
government’s response to guerrilla warfare.3
2.3 Themilitary approachmaybe carried out using either selective or indiscriminate violence, whichhaveopposite
eects on thedynamics of insurgency. Selective state violencepunishes basedon individual behavior, targeting
only rebels or individualswho aided rebellion. Intuitively, such violence has a suppressive eect on insurgency,
as it makes participation in rebellion costlier relative to neutrality or loyalty to the state. The use of selective
violence thus deters civilians from joining or aiding the rebellion (Kalyvas 2006).
2.4 In contrast, indiscriminate state violence punishes civilians based on their ailiation with a group, e.g., their
village or ethnic group, regardless of whether individuals took up arms or assisted rebels in any way. Indis-
criminate violence makes loyalty to the state costly, sometimes even costlier than neutrality, which means it
eectively encourages civilians to join the rebellion (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007). Even when civilians do not join
the rebels they can assist themby providing orwithholding information from the government about the rebels.
In particular, when civilians are aggrieved at the government because of indiscriminate state violence, they are
more likely towithhold private information about the rebels from the government, thus preventing the govern-
ment from using selective violence. This leads to further growth of the insurgency (Berman et al. 2011; Condra
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& Shapiro 2012). Empirically, this logic has been supported bymultiple studies, and practitioners of COIN have
also recognized the importance of avoiding state indiscriminate violence (Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Army/-
Marine Corps Field Manual. FM 3-24. MCWP 3-33.5 2006; Petraeus 2006; Sepp 2005).4
2.5 Given the counterproductive eect of indiscriminate violence, it is puzzling why states use it. Possible reasons
include lack of intelligence (Kalyvas 2006), bad discipline (Humphreys &Weinstein 2008), or its ability to drive a
wedgebetween insurgents andcivilians (Lyall 2009). Wedonot focuson the reasonswhyagovernment chooses
to use indiscriminate or selective violence, leaving these decisions exogenous in our model, instead focusing
on the consequences of these decisions.
2.6 Following Bennett (2008), we model both selective and indiscriminate types of violence. The military strat-
egy has two features: (i) state soldiers’ ability to identify and capture the target, i.e., intelligence about who
the insurgents are and ability to remove insurgents from the population (eectiveness), and (ii) the extent of
collateral damage if any, i.e., howmany civilians are hurt during the operation (accuracy). Thus, following Ben-
nett (2008), ourmodelmay represent a range ofmilitary approaches from pure indiscriminate violence to pure
selective violence.
2.7 What is the aid approach? An aid strategy relies on “carrot” operations to persuade civilians to support the
central government by delivering political, economic, anddevelopment benefits that come in the formof direct
aid, employment, medical care, infrastructure, and other non-violent projects (U.S. Government Counterinsur-
gency Guide 2009, pp. 14–15). We use “aid” as a short cut to describe any services provided to civilians aimed
at improving their welfare.
2.8 Not every aid program is created equal. Someprograms increase support and cooperation fromcivilians, which
in turn allows the government to decrease insurgent attacks. Other programs seem to have no impact on in-
surgency dynamics. For instance, in the Iraq war, scholars compared the large-scale infrastructure building
projectsmanaged byUSAID and small-scale programsmanaged by battalion commanders designed to provide
local public goods. They concluded that small-budget programs designed to address specific local needs of
communities weremore eective at increasing civilians’ support and cooperation than large-budget programs
that were attempting to aect change beyond one local district (Berman et al. 2011, 2013). Intuitively, among
small-budget programs, those designed by groups of specialists with diplomatic, reconstruction, and military
expertise weremore eective at garnering civilians’ cooperation than programs designed without expert input
(Berman et al. 2013).
2.9 Given these results, we do not focus on global aid programs that could theoretically improve the welfare of
the entire civilian population in our model. Instead, we model localized eects of the aid approach. Since
some local programs may be designed without any expert feedback, we allow for the eects of the aid strat-
egy to vary with respect to the number of civilians recruited at a time and the intensity with which civilians’
attitudes change.5 The state aid approach varies across two dimensions in our model: (i) the number of civil-
ians aected by an interaction and (ii) the intensity of change in the aected civilians’ attitudes. As a result, a
well-designed small-scale programwould increase the approval of the government amongmore civilians than
a poorly-designed program.
2.10 Insurgents may also use non-violent recruitment strategies to increase their ranks of fighters and their support
among civilians. Sometimes, insurgent organizations fill the void of governance and provide both public goods
and law enforcement services to the population. For instance, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula distributed
water to families in Southern Abyan during summer heat, installed electric lines to communities that never had
electricity before, and helped carry out investigations about stolen property (Johnsen 2014, p. 279). In other
cases, insurgentorganizations invest less in communities, instead seekingnewrecruits through individualmon-
etary benefits or emphasis on one’s group identity. For instance, the Taliban has focused its recruitment eorts
on providing attractive salary packages combinedwith appealing to Pashtunwali cultural notions of honor (Eu-
ropean Asylum Support Oice 2012). To use Olson’s (1993) terminology, in our model, both the state and the
insurgents are acting partially as “stationary bandits” as wemodel the struggle between the two political orga-
nizations to increase their territorial control over a given locality. It thus makes sense for insurgents as well as
the state soldiers to provide some services to the population and avoid stealing 100% of the civilians’ profits to
extract greater returns in the longer term.
2.11 In short, both sides of the conflict use non-violent means to win the approval of the population, eventually
controlling it. While noempiricalworkhas systematically studied thequality of insurgent useof theaid strategy,
we assume that some eorts of the rebels’ non-violent methods of recruitment work better than others. Thus,
wemodel the quality of the rebel aid approach as varying across the same dimensions as the government aid:
the number of civilians aected by an interaction and the intensity of change of civilians’ attitudes.
2.12 Why model these two approaches simultaneously? Recent empirical work in the counterinsurgency liter-
ature has concluded that it is the synergy between a government’s aid and military strategies that is key to
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suppressing an insurgency (Berman et al. 2013). In other words, we should expect that a combination of the
military action that targets insurgents without harming civilians and small-scale aid programs that address a
specific local need will have a better chance at defeating an insurgency than state eorts that harm civilians
and employ large-scale projects that bypass local community needs. It is less clear how dierent mixtures of
these strategies might succeed or fail at defeating an insurgency. If the military and aid approaches are both
important, then what is their relative contribution to achieving the desired outcome for the government? The
use of a computationalmodel allows us to compare various combinations of strategies by insurgents and coun-
terinsurgents and determine which approach plays a more important role in defeating an insurgency.
2.13 Our model does not represent counterinsurgency comprehensively. Rather, following Epstein (2008), it illumi-
nates one element of this phenomenon, the relative contribution of non-violent and violent methods to the
success of counterinsurgency. Previous models captured the relative weight of selective vs. indiscriminate tar-
geting of insurgents (e.g., Kress &MacKay 2014; Bennett 2008) and considered the use of violent vs. non-violent
methods of counterinsurgency in concert (e.g., Findley & Young 2007; Caulkins et al. 2008; Kress & Szechtman
2009). Ourmodel contributes to this lineof researchbyallowingcounterinsurgents tousevarious combinations
of the military and aid approach by also focusing on the specific features of each approach.
The Model
3.1 Our model expands Bennett’s (2008) model of early stages of insurgency. We chose Bennett’s (2008) model as
a starting point because he allows for a full range of military strategies from highly indiscriminate to highly se-
lective. Bennett (2008) omits the aid strategy altogether, a gap thatwe fill. See Figure 1 for a graphical represen-
tation of how ourmodel diers fromBennett’s (2008). The complete pseudo code is included in the Appendix.6
Themodel parameters and their default values are listed in Table 1.
3.2 Time: In the course of each simulationmodel run, the interactions among agents (the actors in themodel) may
develop into a defeat of insurgency (all insurgents are removed which terminates the run) or a sustained insur-
gency (if the simulation reaches 5,000 ticks, it terminates the run). The sequencewithin each tick is described in
the following subsections and is represented graphically in Figure 1. Each tick includes an action sequence by a
randomly selected insurgent, followed by an action sequence by a randomly selected soldier. A selected insur-
gent probabilistically decides between attacking a soldier, which always triggers a counterattack by a soldier,
and peacefully recruiting civilians, which probabilistically triggers a counterattack by a soldier. Then, during
state turn, a selected soldier probabilistically decides between attacking an insurgent and peacefully recruiting
civilians (providing aid). One may think of a model’s tick as an hour or perhaps a day. While time units are not
defined in this model, it makes sense to think of a tick as a rather short period of time.
3.3 Agents: The model assumes two core types of agents: civilians, who may become rebels/insurgents, and sol-
diers, who never change their identity. Wemake no assumptions about social groupings among civilians, con-
tinuing to rely on “light” agents, as Bennett (2008) does.
3.4 Civilians represent the bulk of a population. Individual civilians are characterized by a degree of anger at the
government, a degree of fear of the government, and a violence threshold, i.e., a propensity to use violence un-
der the right circumstances. Table 1 describes the default distributions used to “populate” the world with civil-
ians of these characteristics. The three parameters are distributed normally, however, the mean of the anger
parameter distribution is 0.25, while the mean of the fear and violence threshold parameter distributions is set
to 0.5. This allows for only a small proportion of civilians to become initially latent insurgents (Bennett 2008,
3.4).7 Five hundred (500) civilians are placed on the grid by default.
Notation Parameter Scope Definition Range Default
Value
Space Size Global Dimensions of map grid 1+ 50
Interaction
Range
Global Size of neighborhood for in-
surgents looking to attack,
and for collateral damage
range
1 to size of map 3
eectiveness Eectiveness Global/ All
soldier
Probability of removing an
insurgent during a soldier’s
counterattack
0.0 to 1.0 0.01 to0.9*
Continued in the following page
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Continuing from previous page
Notation Parameter Scope Definition Range Default
Value
accuracy Accuracy Global/ All
Soldiers
1-accuracy equals the prob-
ability of injuring any civil-
ianwithin interaction range
during a soldier’s counter-
attack
0.0 to 1.0 0.01 to0.9*
anger Initial
Anger
Individual/
Each
Civilian
Initial level of this civilian’s
anger at the government
0.0 to 1.0 Normally
dis-
tributed,
mean 0.25,
SD 0.125
fear Initial Fear Individual/
Each
Civilian
Initial level of this civil-
ian’s fear of government
response to insurgent act
0.0 to 1.0 Normally
dis-
tributed,
mean 0.5,
SD 0.25
Violence
Threshold
Individual/
Each
Civilian
Level that anger must
pass for civilian to be will-
ing to engage in violent
insurgency
0.0 to 1.0 Normally
dis-
tributed,
mean 0.5,
SD 0.25
Fear Incre-
ment
Global Amount that fear increases
in each civilian injured by a
soldier counterattack
0+ 0.1
Anger
Increment
per Injury
Global/All
Soldiers
Amount per injured civilian
that anger changes in each
civilian injured by:
-1 to +1
(normally>0)
- Moderate - soldier counterattack
(when soldier was re-
sponding to insurgent
action)
0.05
- High - soldier proactive attack
(when soldier attacks
in turn Turn rather than
recruiting)
0.1
PIR P(Insurgent
Recruits)
Global/All
Insurgents
Probability an insurgent
will recruit when selected
to take action (alternative
is to undertake attack)
0.0 to 1.0 0.0 to 0.9*
Recruits) All will recruit when selected
Anger
Change
Given
Insurgent
Recruit-
ment
Global/ All
Insurgents
Change in civilian anger af-
ter being recruited by insur-
gent
-1.0 to +1.0
(normally>0)
0.0 to
0.25*
Number
Civil-
ians Re-
cruitable
by Insur-
gent
Global/ All
Insurgents
Number of civilians an in-
surgent aects if it recruits
1+ 1 to 9*
Continued in the following page
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Continuing from previous page
Notation Parameter Scope Definition Range Default
Value
P(Insurgent
Exposed)
Given an
Attack
Global/ All
Insurgents
Probability an insurgent is
exposed when it attacks
0.0 to 1.0 1
PIEWR P(Insurgent
Exposed)
Given it
Recruits
Global/All
Insurgents
Probability an insurgent is
exposed when it recruits
0.0 to 1.0 0.0 to
0.99*
PGR P(Soldier
Does Good
Works)
Global/ All
Soldiers
Probability a soldier will re-
cruit (provideaid),whense-
lected to take action (alter-
native is to undertake at-
tack)
0.0 to 1.0 0.0 to 0.9*
Anger
Change
Given
Soldier Re-
cruitment
Global/ All
Soldiers
Change in civilian anger af-
ter being recruited by Sol-
dier
-1 to +1 -0.25 to
Number
Civil-
ians Re-
cruitable
by Soldier
Global/ All
Soldiers
Number of civilians a sol-
dier aects if it recruits
1+ 1 to 9*
Table 1: Summary of parameters in the COIN model. Note: * Denotes
the key 9 parameters systematically varied by iterating through dis-
crete values of a parameter in the 38 million simulations, used to cre-
ateanexhaustiveparameter space for themodel of counterinsurgency.
See Table 2 for discrete values of evaluated parameters
3.5 A rebel/insurgent is a civilian who is willing to engage in violence against the government, and specifically
against a nearby soldier (who represents the government). Insurgents in turn may be latent, i.e., willing to
engage in violence, or active, i.e., having actually done so. Growth of insurgency occurs in the model when or-
dinary civilians turn into insurgents. A civilian becomes a latent insurgent when the civilian is angrier at the
government than afraid of it (angerit > fearit), and if their anger passes an individual threshold propensity to
use violence (angerit > violence thresholdit). If a latent insurgent is within a defined range of a soldier and is
given an opportunity, then the latent insurgent will conduct an attack and become an active insurgent.
3.6 The insurgents’ assumed goal is to convertmore civilians into insurgents. Each tick, a randomly selected latent
insurgent either attacks a nearby soldier (ifPIR is less than a randomdraw from a uniform distribution) or uses
the aid strategy to peacefully recruit nearby civilians (if PIR is greater than or equal to a random draw). The
general activity of “peaceful recruitment” covers many specific actions on the ground that a civilian could use
to express his or her anger at the government, including secretly recruiting followers, participating in a protest
to express displeasure, writing or blogging or posting, or usingmany other specific activities designed to create
attention and draw followers to the insurgents’ cause.8
3.7 Soldiers’ assumed goal is to remove all of the latent insurgents from the world, thereby defeating the insur-
gency. Soldiers target insurgents to pursue this goal. Each tick, a randomly selected soldier either attacks an
active nearby insurgent if there is any (ifPGR is less than a randomdraw fromauniformdistribution) or uses the
aid strategy to peacefully recruit nearby civilians (ifPGR is greater than or equal to a randomdraw). By default,
100 soldiers are placed on the grid.
3.8 Space: We did not alter the simulation space from Bennett’s (2008) model, thus the space in the model is sim-
ulated by a two-dimensional grid (not a torus) of rectangular cells (by default, the size of the grid is 50 by 50
cells). Agents interact only with their neighbors, where neighbors are defined as all actors within a specified
Moore distance (3 cells by default). We may think of this space as a city district, or a city, or a country. Each
agent occupies one grid cell, and only one agent can occupy one cell. The agents do not move.
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Figure 1: The flowchart of the COINmodel’s single tick. Note: *The soldier counterattack and attack sequences
are shown in Figure 2. The portions of the flowchart in white represent Bennett’s (2008) model, on which we
based our COINmodel. PIR, represents the probability that an insurgent will recruit, i.e., employ the aid strat-
egy, this turn. pi+n represents a simple draw from a uniform distribution. PIEWR represents the probability
that an insurgent is exposed when it recruits. PGR represents the probability that a solder will recruit, i.e., em-
ploy the aid strategy, this turn. PIR, PIEWR, and PGR are among the systematically varied parameters of the
simulation. For details, see Equations 1, 3a, 3b and Tables 1-2.
Figure 2: The flowchart of the soldier counterattack/attack sequence. Note: This flowchart details the soldier
counterattack/attack sequence; see Figure 1 for the flowchart of the full single tick of the COINmodel.
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3.9 World Map Display: We also did not alter the display of agents from Bennett’s (2008) model. Agents are dis-
played in the space via dierent colors and shapes. Civilian agentsmay be green (anger<fear<violence thresh-
old), yellow (anger>fear and fear<violence threshold), orange (latent insurgents, i.e., anger>fear>violence
threshold), or red (active insurgents, i.e., a latent insurgent that carried out an attack). Soldier agents are rep-
resented by blue squares, outlined in red when soldiers are attacked by active insurgents.
3.10 Modeling the military approach: As Figure 1 shows, there are three circumstances in which soldiers may use
the military action: (i) during a soldier’s turn, a soldier may probabilistically determine to attack, given that
there is an active insurgent in the neighborhood; (ii) during an insurgent’s turn, a soldier responds to an in-
surgent attack with a counterattack; (iii) during an insurgent’s turn, a soldier responds to an insurgent’s use
of aid, if an active insurgent is detected during peaceful recruitment. While a significant portion of violence in
civil conflicts is remote, e.g., the use of improvised explosive devices by the rebels or the use of drones by the
government, here we only model direct violence. Future research should explore the consequences of remote
violence on duration of insurgency.9
3.11 A soldier executes the military action by removing (capturing or killing) an insurgent with a probability equal
to the soldier’s level of eectiveness, i.e., P(Soldier Removes Insurgent)=eectiveness. This parameter captures
soldiers’ ability to identify who the insurgents in the population are and target them. In other words, it is un-
certain if soldiers will be able to identify who the insurgent is aer observing an attack occur. The eectiveness
parameter is supposed to capture the diiculty of obtaining intelligence about who the insurgents are in a pop-
ulation.
3.12 The probability that a soldier’s counterattack inflicts collateral damage on each civilian in the neighborhood
of the targeted insurgent is parameterized by the soldier’s level of accuracy, i.e., each nearby civilian is injured
with probability P(Soldier Injures Civilians)=1−accuracy. Furthermore, multiple civilians may be hurt in the
soldier’s counterattack creating a temporary variable Number of Civilians Injured, which records the number of
hurt civilians for a current instance of soldier counterattack. When any civilian is hurt, his or her level of fear of
the government increases (a deterrent eect), as shown below each civilian i in tick t+ 1:
feari(t+1) = fearit + 0.1(1− fearit) (1)
3.13 In addition, a civilian’s level of anger also increases. Furthermore, anger increases in proportion to the total
number of civilians injured by the soldier’s attack and the amount of increase accounts for whether a soldier
was provoked by an insurgent, as follows:
angeri(t+1) = angerit + 0.05 ∗ Number of Civilians Injured ∗ (1− angerit) (2a)
angeri(t+1) = angerit + 0.1 ∗ Number of Civilians Injured ∗ (1− angerit) (2b)
where for each civilian i in tick t+1, anger level will be updated following Equation 2a, if a soldierwas provoked
and counterattacks during an insurgent’s turn. By contrast, civilian angerwill be updated following Equation 2b
if a soldier attacks during a soldier’s turn without being provoked. In other words, we assume that civilians will
not get as angry by soldiers’ harming bystanders if the soldiers were responding to an insurgent attack. All
civilian characteristics are bounded between 0 and 1, such that if any value exceeds these boundaries it is reset
to a boundary level. When anger and fear change, new latent insurgents may be created, or an insurgent could
potentially be pushed back to being a regular civilian.
3.14 Consider an example. Two civilians got injured during a soldier’s counterattack. Civilian A had fear of 0.1 and
anger of 0.05, while civilianB had fear of 0.6 and anger of 0.3. CivilianA’s fearwill update to 0.19, while civilian
B’s fear will update to 0.64, showing the “diminishing return” in fearfulness to reflect that over time it takes
more extreme actions to provoke the same response in human beings (Bennett 2008, 3.13). Similarly, civilian
A’s anger will update from 0.05 to 0.145, while civilianB’s anger will update from 0.3 to 0.37. If civiliansA and
B were injured in an unprovoked attack by a soldier, then their fear in tick t + 1would have been the same as
aer a counterattack, but their anger levels would have been 0.24 and 0.44 respectively.
3.15 The model assumes that soldiers do not die. In addition, the supply of civilians is eectively infinite: although
insurgents die and are removed, they are always replaced with a randomized civilian (not necessarily a new
insurgent) placed somewhere in the world grid.
3.16 Modeling the aid approach: Both soldiers and rebels probabilistically decide between attacking their oppo-
nents andemploying aid to recruit nearby civilians peacefully. Theprobability of eachaction is set exogenously,
and globally (one value for all soldiers, one for all civilians). This exogenous, centralized probability setting pro-
vides direction across agents. If a central government or other command structure were to dictate (and rigor-
ously enforce) that one option was always to be followed, the probability of one action would be set to 0% or
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100%. Alternatively, as agents have more discretion/freedom, the probability will be closer to 50%. In other
words, we are specifying that the proclivity to carry out aid projects is set centrally, but communication, im-
pact, and reaction come from local gains/visibility of these projects. A future project could expand the spread
of informationby expanding the radius of interaction/viewaroundanyaction. We suspect that thiswould accel-
erate the dynamics of the model rather than make a fundamental change, but fully exploring the implications
of global communication/information remains for further work.
3.17 If a soldier chooses to use the aid strategy during his or her turn, then the soldier will gain support decrease
the anger of a Number of Recruitable Civilians by Soldier by a given increment Anger Change Given Soldier Re-
cruitment. Both parameters are varied systematically in the model, as described in Table 2. The Number of
Recruitable Civilians by Soldier takes on values of 1, 5, and 9 civilians. The increment by which civilians’ anger
declines varies as -0.25, -0.15, and -0.05. The recruited civilians’ anger in the following tick is updated as:
angeri(t+1) = angerit + Anger Change Given Soldier Recruitment ∗ (1− angerit) (3)
3.18 For example, civiliansA andB, whose anger levels were 0.05 and 0.3 respectively in tick t, were recruited by a
soldier that was assigned to recruit 5 civilians decreasing their anger by 0.1. In tick t+1,A’s anger will become
0 (-0.045 would be updated to 0) andB’s anger will become 0.23. If the soldier was able to decrease civilians’
anger only by 0.05, then updated anger levels would be 0.0025 forA and 0.265 forB.
3.19 When a rebel chooses to use aid, she or he is assumed to increase the anger of aNumber of Recruitable Civilians
by Insurgent (systematically varied in the simulation between 1, 5, and 9) by a certain increment, Anger Change
Given Insurgent Recruitment (systematically varied between 0.05, 0.15, and 0.25). The aected civilians’ anger
in the following time unit will be:
angeri(t+1) = angerit + Anger Change Given Insurgent Recruitment ∗ (1− angerit) (4)
3.20 For instance, the same civilians A and B, whose anger levels were 0.05 and 0.3 respectively in tick t, were
recruited among the 5 other civilians by a rebel. The rebel was able to increase civilians’ anger by 0.1. In tick
t+ 1,A’s anger will become 0.145 andB’s anger will become 0.37. If the soldier was able to decrease civilians’
anger only by 0.05, then updated anger levels would be 0.0975 forA and 0.335 forB.
3.21 As with the attacking insurgents, detection of peacefully recruiting insurgents is uncertain. When insurgents
attack, in the simulation code, they are revealed to soldiers, but soldiers may have low ability to identify and
remove insurgents, i.e., low eectiveness, thus we say that identifying true insurgents is uncertain, as the prob-
ability of their capture varies. The probability of insurgent exposurewhen recruiting,PIEWR, is varied between
0, 0.5, and 1.0. This modeling choice leads to insurgent attacks always triggering soldiers’ counterattack (that
may or may not remove the insurgent or injure innocent bystanders), while peaceful recruitment triggers sol-
dier counterattack with probability PIEWR. This modeling choice reflects the underlying reality that violent
action is easier to detect and justify a response to. While perfect detection of peacefully recruiting rebels is un-
realistic, we investigate this scenario to understandwhether the gains from intelligence are linear. They are not,
as explain in the analysis section.
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Notation Model Parameter Discrete values an-
alyzed
Total unique values
eectiveness Eectiveness 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3,
0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
0.9
10
accuracy Accuracy 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3,
0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
0.9
10
PGR P(Soldier Does GoodWorks) 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4,
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
10
Number of Civilians Recruitable by Soldier 1, 5, 9 3
Anger Change Given Soldier Recruitment -0.25, -0.15, -0.05 3
PIR P(Insurgent Recruits) 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4,
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
10
Number of Civilians Recruitable by Insurgent 1, 5, 9 3
Anger Change Given Insurgent Recruitment 0.05, 0.15, 0.25 3
PIEWR P(Insurgent Exposed Given it Recruits) 0.0, 0.5, 1.0 3
Table 2: Discrete values of the varied parameters for the COINmodel
Example Runs
4.1 Each runof the simulationproducesanentirehistoryof interactionsbetweensoldiers and rebels, andcontinues
either until the insurgency is defeated (no latent insurgents remain in the world), or 5,000 ticks are reached
(loosely indicating a self-sustaining insurgency).
4.2 We illustrate the dynamics of the simulation by showing the termination state display output for nine individual
runs in Figures 3, 4, and5. Figure 3describes thedisplay output for three runs, all ofwhichhadhighly inaccurate
and ineective military action by soldiers (eectiveness=0.2 and accuracy=0.2), i.e., soldiers miss targets and
injure bystanders 80% of the time. Figure 4 presents the display output for three runs, in which soldiers had
medium levels of accuracy and eectiveness (0.5 each). Figure 5 shows the output from the three runs, inwhich
soldierswere highly accurate and eective (eectiveness=0.8 and accuracy=0.8), i.e., soldiersmiss targets and
injure bystanders 20% of the time.
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Figure 3: Various aid scenarios for eectiveness=0.2 and accuracy=0.2. Scenario (a), on top: No aid, simula-
tion reaches 5,000 ticks, i.e., sustained insurgency. Scenario (b), in middle: Soldiers use aid 50% of the time,
number of recruitable civilians by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, insurgency reaches
5,000 ticks, i.e., sustained insurgency. Scenario (c), on the bottom: Soldiers use aid 50% of the time, number
of recruitable civilians by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, insurgents use aid 50% of
the time, number of recruitable civilians by insurgent=9; anger change given insurgent recruitment=0.25, insur-
gency reaches 5,000 ticks, i.e., sustained insurgency.
4.3 Each panel of Figures 3, 4, and 5 shows three displays. The lemost display is the two-dimensional world map
grid on which the actors are located. It is described in subsection World Map Display of the section Model.
4.4 The central display titled “Actors” shows the counts of actors and events in the simulation run over time. The
y-axis shows a simple count of agents and instances of events; one unit on the y-axis represents 100 agents/in-
stances. The x-axis represents time; one unit of the x-axis represents 1,000 ticks. In all nine runs, this display
shows that the simulation has 500 civilians at all times (shown in blue), because we replace each killed insur-
gent with a randomly placed civilian. In addition, the central display tracks the number of active insurgents
(shown in red), number of latent insurgents (green), cumulative number of insurgents killed (black), and the
number of recent attacks (orange). The rightmost display “Anger/Fear” shows the average levels of anger and
fear among civilians over time. Both anger and fear are bounded between 0 and 1 and so is the y-axis of the
rightmost display. The x-axis represents time; one unit of the x-axis represents 1,000 ticks.
4.5 Panels (a), (b), and (c) of Figures 3-5 dier by how the actors employ aid. Panel (a) replicates the model in
Bennett (2008) without letting soldiers or insurgents use any aid option. Panel (b) presents scenarios in which
soldiers use a well-designed aid program 50% of the time, but insurgents never use aid. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that most rebel groups provide at least some public goods to the local communities, so this scenario
is unrealistic. Yet, it is useful as a hypothetical best-case scenario for the government. Finally, panel (c) shows
scenarios in which both soldiers and insurgents employ well-designed aid programs 50% of the time. By “well-
designed”aidprogramswemean those that aectnine civilians at a timeanddecrease/increase civilians’anger
by the greatest increment of -0.25 (for soldiers) and 0.25 (for insurgents).
4.6 Finally, we used the random seed of 1 for each of the nine runs to ensure comparability among the nine runs.
4.7 The role of aid for soldiers of low accuracy and eectiveness. Consider Figure 3, which shows scenarios of
soldiers with low accuracy and eectiveness (both 0.2), a “nightmare scenario for most governments. . . [that]
might fit the caseof fightinganurbancounterinsurgency campaign,where insurgentshavemanyplaces tohide,
and where noninsurgent civilians are densely packed” (Bennett 2008, 4.11). All three scenarios (3a, 3b, and 3c)
are forced to stop at the 5,000th tick, indicating that an insurgency spreads throughout the entire population
and becomes established in a given territorial unit.
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4.8 Compared to scenario 3a, the introduction of soldiers’ aid strategy (3b) lowers the average level of anger in the
population, as shown in the Anger/Fear display. In scenario 3a, it takes only 438 ticks for soldiers to create a
hostile population (at tick 439, average anger exceeds than average fear and remains close to or above 0.9 for
the rest of themodel run). When only soldiers employ aid (3b), the average anger never surpasses average fear;
it takes 1,892 ticks for the average anger to reach 0.7 for the same inaccurate and ineective soldiers (in 3a the
average anger of 0.7 was reached at ticks 439). When both rebels and soldiers employ aid (3c), the average
anger approaches but never surpasses average fear and it takes 1,314 ticks to reach the average anger of 0.7.
4.9 Introducing aid gives soldiers fewer opportunities to remove insurgents, thus, the cumulative number of killed
insurgents declines from 1,237 in scenario 3a with no aid to 800 in 3b and 713 in 3c. Recall that soldiers tar-
get insurgents as a response to insurgent attack and during soldier turn (on patrol). This is why introducing
soldier aid strategy 50% of the time does not cut the number of removed insurgents in half. Furthermore, if
rebels recruit civilians peacefully (3c), they further reduce soldiers’ opportunities to counterattack and remove
insurgents from the population as insurgent exposure when they recruit is probabilistic.
4.10 Feweropportunities toattack, combinedwith insurgents raising civilians’ anger inaddition to soldiers’ angering
civilians by creating collateral damage, leads to 40% of the population becoming active insurgents by the end
of run 3c. This large number of active insurgents is also shown by clusters of red circles in worldmap display in
panel 3c. By contrast, only 8% and 3% of civilians constitute active insurgent at the 5,000th tick of runs 3a and
3b respectively, implying that if the runs 3a-3c were not interrupted at the 5,000th tick, scenario 3c would have
lasted much longer than 3a and 3b.
4.11 In summary, soldiers that miss insurgent targets and injure civilians 80% of the time cannot defeat an insur-
gency at its early stages, even when they employ aid. While relying on aid helps slow the speed of growth of
insurgency, aid cannot compensate for the dangerous eects of ineective and inaccurate military action.
4.12 The role of aid for soldiers of medium accuracy and eectiveness. Consider Figure 4, which depicts end-state
output from three scenarios of soldiers withmedium accuracy and eectiveness (both 0.5). Scenario 4a is con-
sistent with Bennett’s (2008) finding that once soldiers capture targets and avoid hurting civilians at 40% of
the time or more, an average duration of insurgency drops considerably. Scenarios 4a, 4b, and 4c end before
the 5,000th tick, indicating that an insurgency does not become sustained in a given territorial unit. Adding aid
strategy creates a wide variation in the duration of insurgency: the 4a run with no aid ends at the 1,148th tick,
the 4b run with soldiers’ aid ends aer 246 ticks, and the 4c run with both sides’ aid ends at the 3,057th tick.
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Figure 4: Various aid scenarios for eectiveness=0.5 and accuracy=0.5. Scenario (a), on top: No aid, simu-
lation ended aer 1,148 ticks, i.e., insurgency is defeated. Scenario (b), in middle: Soldiers use aid 50% of
the time, number of recruitable civilians by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, simula-
tion ended aer 246 ticks, i.e., insurgency is defeated. Scenario (c), on the bottom: Soldiers use aid 50% of
the time, number of recruitable civilians by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, insurgents
use aid 50% of the time, number of recruitable civilians by insurgent=9; anger change given insurgent recruit-
ment=0.25, simulation ended aer 3,057 ticks, i.e., insurgency is defeated.
4.13 Relative to scenarios 4a and 4b, the 4c run describes a more realistic situation of both sides employing aid. Al-
lowing aid on both sides extends insurgencymore than twofold compared to the 4a run andmore than twelve-
fold compared to the 4b run. This is due two reasons: (i) soldiers go on patrols 50% less, since they recruit
half the time, thus they can remove half of insurgents in a given time period, and (ii) insurgents that peacefully
recruit civilians are not always detected by soldiers.
4.14 In the cases with medium accuracy and eectiveness, average anger in the population never surpasses aver-
age fear. In scenario 4a, the highest level of average anger is 0.42, while introducing soldiers’ aid in 4b lowers
the highest level of anger achieved to 0.31. When both rebels and soldiers employ aid (4c), the average anger
reaches the 0.44 level at about the same time as the peak anger is reached in the 4a run with no aid (around
the 600th and 700th tick respectively).
4.15 Lower levels of average anger among civilians also mean that the runs in Figure 4 end with lower proportions
of latent insurgents than the runs in Figure 3. In the 4c run, insurgents raise civilians’ anger at the government
via aid, making 29.2% of civilians latent insurgents. This proportion is still much lower than half the population
being latent insurgents by the end of the scenario 3c.
4.16 In summary, soldiers thatmiss insurgent targets and injure civilians 50% of the time defeat an insurgency at its
early stages regardless of the aid approach. It is important to note that for the cases of soldiers’ medium levels
of accuracy and eectiveness, the set-up of the aid strategy may extend the duration of insurgency more than
twice when both soldiers and insurgents peacefully recruit.
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Figure 5: accuracy = 0.8 and eectiveness = 0.8. Scenario (a), on top: Noaid, simulation ends aer 30 ticks, i.e.,
insurgency is defeated. Scenario (b), inmiddle: Soldiers useaid50%of the time,numberof recruitable civilians
by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, simulation ended aer 24 ticks, i.e., insurgency
is defeated. Scenario (c), on the bottom: Soldiers use aid 50% of the time, number of recruitable civilians
by soldier=9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.25, insurgents use aid 50% of the time, number of
recruitable civilians by insurgent=9; anger change given insurgent recruitment=0.25, simulation ended aer
283 ticks, i.e., insurgency is defeated.
4.17 The role of aid for soldiers of high accuracy and eectiveness. Consider Figure 5, which presents end-state
output from three scenarios of soldierswithhighaccuracy and eectiveness (both0.8). Scenario 5a is consistent
with Bennett’s (2008) finding that once soldiers capture targets and avoid hurting civilians at 80% of the time,
an insurgency is defeated swily (in just 30 ticks in the 5a run). Among scenarios 5a, 5b, and 5c, the latter
depicts the longest insurgency that ends aer 283 ticks, still a very short insurgency compared to the runs of
Figure 4. This further demonstrates that the levels of accuracy and eectiveness of soldiers’ military action are
the primary determinants of the duration of insurgency. This is not to say that the aid strategy does notmatter.
For instance, letting both soldiers and insurgents recruit half the time in the 5c run extends an insurgencymore
than nine-fold relative to scenario 5a. Yet, even this extended duration is very short when compared to runs
with low/medium eectiveness and accuracy.
Analysis of Repeated Simulations
5.1 The duration of insurgency is an emergent feature of our model, such that if the soldiers have no latent insur-
gents in their range, the insurgency is considered defeated. Alternatively, reaching 5,000 ticks terminates a
run, loosely indicating a self-sustaining insurgency.10 We evaluate the output of the simulation, assuming that
government actors prefer insurgencies that are shorter and rebel actors – longer.
5.2 Table 2 specifies the discrete values of key initialization parameters and details the total number of unique
combinations of parameter values: 4 parameterswere varied across 10 discrete values, while 5 parameterswere
varied across 3 values, resulting in (104)(35) = 2, 430, 000 unique combinations of parameter values. Since the
model has stochastic elements, we analyze summaries of multiple histories generated from the starting value
sets to determine reliable trends that appear across multiple iterations of the model, rather than examining a
single run which might not be representative. 38 million simulation runs were recorded and collapsed into a
dataset of 2.43 million observations, such that each observation is an average of 10 to 15 runs of the model at
each unique combination of parameter values.
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5.3 Baseline eect of the quality of the military approach. Figure 6 shows the duration of insurgency varying as a
function of the quality of the military strategy for those cases when neither side uses aid strategy (also see row
1 in Table 5.10 for more precise mean and variance values).11
5.4 We use this surface as a baseline for comparison with the scenarios discussed below. In this and subsequent
graphs, theheight representsdurationof insurgency (boundedbetween0and5,000,where themaximumpoint
represents the cuto, at which we assume that insurgency cannot be defeated). Length and depth of the graph
represent soldiers’ eectiveness and accuracy (both bounded between 0.01 and 0.9), two features that define
the quality of the military strategy.
5.5 Figure 6 shows a reverse relationship between the quality of the military strategy and the duration of insur-
gency: insurgencies are longest when accuracy and/or eectiveness are low and shortest when those levels are
high. If soldiers miss targets more than 70% of the time (eectiveness<0.3), it takes a high level of accuracy
to defeat an insurgency (accuracy>0.7). If soldiers create collateral damage more than 70% of the time (ac-
curacy<0.3), improvements in eectiveness lead to shorter insurgencies. If both accuracy and eectiveness
improve above 30%, insurgencies can be defeated rapidly.
5.6 Baseline eect of the quality of aid: Both sides (soldiers and rebels) may employ the aid strategy. Figure 7
presents highly stylized scenarios in which only one side does so (only soldiers provide aid in 6a and only insur-
gents – in 7b). In both panels of Figure 7 actors employ awell-designed aid strategy, i.e., soldiers and insurgents
aect 5 to 9 civilians, whose anger is changed by larger anger increments (-0.15 and -0.25 for soldiers’ aid strat-
egy and 0.15 and 0.25 for insurgents’ aid strategy).
Figure 6: Duration of insurgency by accuracy and eectiveness. No aid.
5.7 The main takeaway of Figure 7 is unsurprising: one’s decision to abandon the aid strategy benefits the oppo-
nent. As panel 7a shows, if insurgents never employ aid, while state soldiers use well-designed development
programs 90% of the time, then even militarily inaccurate and ineective soldiers will defeat insurgency (all
cases of insurgency end under 4,000 ticks, thus not one case becomes a sustained insurgency). Similarly, if
soldiers never employ the aid strategy, yet rebels are able to aect multiple civilians at a time, then whether
insurgents will succeed at reaching 5,000 ticks depends entirely on how accurate and eective the soldiers are.
If soldiers locate targets at least 30% of the time (eectiveness≥0.3) and avoid hurting civilians at least 30% of
the time (accuracy≥0.3) they will be able to remove all insurgents before it reaches 5,000 ticks. Furthermore,
if soldiers’ eectiveness and accuracy≥0.5, they defeat insurgency very quickly (in under 1,000 ticks). While
these scenarios are unrealistic, they help illustrate that even when soldiers ignore aid, they still can defeat an
insurgency if their military response relies on intelligence and avoids hurting civilians.
5.8 Is themilitary or aid approachmore important in defeating insurgency? Ourmodel yields that, for soldiers
to defeat an insurgency, improvements inaccuracy and eectiveness aremore important than improvements in
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the two features of the aid strategy: the number of recruitable civilians by soldier and anger change given soldier
recruitment. In other words, if the model’s assumptions capture insurgency dynamics adequately, it is more
critical for soldiers to invest in their ability to acquire intelligence about who the rebels are (parameterized by
eectiveness) and do so without hurting bystanders (parameterized by accuracy), than to invest in designing
such economic development programs that would improve the welfare of more civilians.
5.9 Table 5.10 presents average durations of insurgency by the features of the aid strategy and by the features of
the military approach. Horizontal scenarios are numbered from 1 to 11. Each scenario contains five rows to
presentdurationsof insurgencyas theaverage, standarddeviation, 25th percentile,median, and75th percentile.
The scenarios are labeled as high, medium, and low quality of the aid program’s design, parameterized by the
number of recruitable civilians by soldier/insurgent and the anger change given soldier/insurgent recruitment. In
addition, each scenario contains three columns that represent high, medium, and low levels of accuracy and
eectiveness of soldiers’ military action respectively.
5.10 For each scenario presented across rows of Table 5.10, improvements in the quality of the military approach
lead to greater reductions in duration of insurgency than improvements in the quality of aid. In other words,
dierences across columns of Table 5.10 are greater than dierences across rows. The eect of aid quality is
especially small in the rightmost column of cases with inaccurate and ineective military approach: with one
exception (discussed in the following subsection), all average durations are less than a standard deviation away
from a sustained insurgency (5,000 ticks).12 In our simulation, it is possible for soldiers to defeat rebels when
soldiers’ aid strategy aects only a few civilians but their military strategy is eective and accurate. In contrast,
it is impossible for a government to defeat an insurgency if soldiers aect a lot of civilians through aid programs
but cannot identify rebels or capture themwithout hurting bystanders.
Figure 7: Duration of insurgency by accuracy and eectiveness. Various aid scenarios. Scenario (a), on the
le: Rate of government recruitment PGR =0.9; number of recruitable civilians by soldier=5,9; anger change
given soldier recruitment=-0.15,-0.25; no insurgent recruitment, PIR =0.0. Scenario (b), on the right: Rate of
insurgent recruitmentPIR =0.9; numberof recruitable civiliansby insurgent=5,9; anger changegiven insurgent
recruitment=0.15,0.25; no soldier recruitment, PGR=0.0.
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Table 3: test
Quality of aid response Quality of military response3 Type of cell entry
Soldiers1 Insurgents2 High Medium Low
1. No aid No aid 15.46 106.05 4231.41 Mean
[2.26] [106.53] [905.64] St. deviation
13.7 40.36 3521.8 25th percentile
15.18 66.09 4739.217 50th percentile
16.91 127.63 5000 75th percentile
2. Aid Aid 53.26 748.28 4590.52 Mean
(all cases) (all cases) [107.70] [1172.06] [805.64] St. deviation
17.75 75.45 4618.69 25th percentile
23.45 186.18 5000 50th percentile
33.83 819.75 5000 75th percentile
3. High High 145.15 1116.71 4689.04 Mean
[111.98] [588.52] [487.37] St. deviation
56.94 719.18 4546.41 25th percentile
132 984.82 4977.61 50th percentile
194.83 1601.16 5000 75th percentile
4. Medium 23.31 154.24 3867.31 Mean
[7.42] [104.09] [1170.06] St. deviation
17.66 76.75 2756.46 25th percentile
22.5 133.73 4329.02 50th percentile
28.9 202.82 4976.68 75th percentile
5. Low 19.01 78.6 3233.89 Mean
[4.60] [48.04] [1470.66] St. deviation
15.36 45.36 1801.75 25th percentile
17.6 63 3731.55 50th percentile
22.75 104.82 4759.91 75th percentile
6. Medium High 267.5 2550.83 4946.26 Mean
[263.01] [1242.32] [119.73] St. deviation
80 1700.72 4985.94 25th percentile
137.64 2487.17 5000 50th percentile
409 3501.36 5000 75th percentile
7. Medium 23.62 351.8 4739.99 Mean
[8.40] [399.87] [441.87] St. deviation
16.3 79.82 4699.62 25th percentile
22.64 207.67 4991.66 50th percentile
26.8 357.64 5000 75th percentile
8. Low 20.6 107.23 4215.17 Mean
[6.02] [83.18] [1055.53] St. deviation
15.36 51 3491.012 25th percentile
20.25 70.36 4719.86 50th percentile
26.4 170.83 5000 75th percentile
9. Low High 345.31 3880.6 4987.11 Mean
[365.84] [1136.44] [43.03] St. deviation
71.94 3168.72 5000 25th percentile
179.75 4299 5000 50th percentile
501.73 4783.18 5000 75th percentile
10. Medium 24.38 927.91 4963.18 Mean
[9.35] [1164.248] [93.91] St. deviation
18.08 110.33 4990.37 25th percentile
21.3 298.75 5000 50th percentile
29.81 1204.81 5000 75th percentile
11. Low 20.17 148.81 4678.001 Mean
[5.37] [174.62] [593.97] St. deviation
Continued in the following page
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Continuing from previous page
Quality of aid response Quality of military response3 Type of cell entry
Soldiers1 Insurgents2 High Medium Low
14.91 48.73 4737.64 25th percentile
19.9 87.67 5000 50th percentile
26.08 172.27 5000 75th percentile
1 High quality of state aid: probability of soldiers employing aid PGR =0.5; anger change
given soldier recruitment=-0.25; number of recruitable civilians by soldier=9. Medium
quality of state aid: PGR =0.5; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.1; number of
recruitable civilians by soldier=5. Lowquality of state aid: PGR =0.5; anger change given
soldier recruitment=-0.05; number of recruitable civilians by soldier=1.
2 High quality of insurgent aid: probability of insurgents employing aid PIR =0.5;
anger change given insurgent recruitment=-0.25; number of recruitable civilians by insur-
gent=9. Medium quality of insurgent aid PIR =0.5; anger change given insurgent re-
cruitment=-0.1; number of recruitable civilians by insurgent=5. Low quality of insurgent
aid: PIR =0.5; anger change given insurgent recruitment=-0.05; number of recruitable
civilians by insurgent=1.
3 High quality of soldiers’ military action: accuracy>0.6; eectiveness>0.6. Medium qual-
ity of soldiers’ military action: accuracy≥0.4 and≤0.6; eectiveness≥0.4 and≤0.6; Low
quality of soldiers’ military action: accuracy≤0.3; eectiveness≤0.3. See Table 1 and Fig-
ure 15 of thewebappendix for an extendedanalysis of insurgency duration, and alsopeak
of latent and active insurgents.
5.11 Could the use of aid ever compensate for a low-quality military strategy? The simulation suggests that a
government may not avoid a sustained insurgency under an ineective and inaccurate military strategy by re-
lying on aid. The only exception to this trend is described in the dark-gray column of scenario 5 of Table 5.10:
the average, median, and 75th percentile durations of insurgency under scenario 5 are 3,233.89, 3,731.55, and
4,759.91 respectively, i.e., this is a long insurgency. In this scenario, inaccurateand ineective soldiersaectnine
civilians through aid programs at a time, while insurgents influence only one civilian through aid at a time.13]
We assume that this scenario is unrealistic, because in practice, insurgents would be better o either increas-
ing their peaceful recruitment eorts or forgoing recruitment altogether, letting the inaccurate and ineective
military action by soldiers backfire even more (since insurgent attacks always trigger soldier counterattacks,
while a counterattack aer insurgent recruitment is based on the probability that an insurgent is exposed given
it recruits, PIEWR).
5.12 In contrast, under amore realistic set-up in which both sides rely on eective aid strategy, the simulation yields
that soldiers cannot defeat insurgents with an ineective and inaccurate military approach (see scenarios 2-4
of Table 5.10). Specifically, scenario 3 of Table 3 represents a case of both soldiers and rebels employing a well-
designed aid strategy, i.e., both types of agents aect nine civilians at a time and change civilians’ anger by
the amount of -0.25 for soldiers and 0.25 for insurgents. Under scenario 3, consider the low quality of military
response scenario that summarizes durations of insurgency for the ineective and inaccuratemilitary approach
(soldiersmiss targets and injure civiliansmore 70%of the time). Themedian insurgency under these conditions
lasts 4,977.61 ticks and the 75th percentile insurgency is considered self-sustaining, interrupted at 5,000 ticks.
5.13 In fact, with the exception of the aforementioned scenario 5, all median insurgencies under the conditions of
inaccurate and ineectivemilitary approach exceed 4,000 time units, i.e., represent prolonged conflicts. Given
that the 5,000th tick cut-o point is arbitrary, we should not put too much weight on the dierence between
insurgencies that end just short of 5,000 and those that are interrupted at the 5,000th step.
5.14 Finally, our model suggests that when both sides use the aid strategy, insurgencies survivemuch longer – even
for the most accurate and eective military operations – than in the cases when the aid strategy is omitted.
Compare all cases of using aid 50% of the time on both sides (scenario 2 of Table 5.10) to the baseline scenario
of no aid on either side (scenario 1 of Table 5.10). The average duration of insurgency in scenario 2 is on average
1.5 times greater than in the scenario 1. The dierences are especially pronounced when comparing the sce-
narios of more eective and accurate military action: insurgencies last on average 16 ticks in scenario 1 vs. 522
ticks in scenario 2 for the soldiers that capture targets and avoid collateral damage > 60%of time. Furthermore,
an average insurgency lasts 177 ticks in scenario 1 vs. 1658 ticks in scenario 2 for soldiers that capture targets
and avoid collateral damage 40-60% of time. At the same time, when comparing themilitaries of low accuracy
JASSS, 20(4) 11, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/11.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3540
and eectiveness across the recruitment scenarios, the dierences are negligible. This is an artificiality intro-
duced by the arbitrary cut-o point of 5,000 ticks. Future research may want to consider other cut-o points
to investigate whether all inaccurate and ineective military strategies are equally bad for the government. In
summary, our main finding that emerges from Table 5.10 is that inaccurate and ineective military approach
cannot be compensated for by a well-designed aid program.
Figure 8: Duration of insurgency by accuracy and eectiveness. Both sides provide aid. Varying probability of
soldiers detecting the peacefully recruiting insurgents. Scenario (a), on the le: Rate of government recruit-
ment PGR >0.6; number of recruitable civilians by soldier=5,9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.15,
-0.25; rate of insurgent recruitment PIR >0.6; number of recruitable civilians by insurgent=5,9; anger change
given insurgent recruitment=0.15, 0.25; probability of insurgent exposure when it recruits PIEWR =0.0. Sce-
nario (b), on the right: Same, but PIEWR =0.5.
5.15 The role of intelligence. Our simulation further yields that collection of intelligence is critical to soldiers’ suc-
cess. Wemodel intelligence collection though two parameters: the probability of locating and removing the at-
tacking insurgents (eectiveness) and the probability of locating the peacefully recruiting insurgents (PIEWR).
In those scenarios when both of these probabilities approach 0, soldiers cannot defeat insurgency.
5.16 Figure 8 plots insurgency duration as a function of soldiers’ eectiveness and accuracy, when both soldiers and
rebels use well-designed aid programs that recruit multiple civilians at a time and change their anger levels
by moderate and high increments. The two panels in Figure 8 dier in soldiers’ ability to detect peacefully re-
cruiting rebels (PIEWR =0 in 8a and 0.5 in 8b). When rebels can peacefully recruit undetected by soldiers (Fig-
ure 8a), insurgency duration depends on whether soldiers acquire intelligence about the attacking insurgents
(eectiveness) and whether soldiers can avoid collateral damage during their response operations (accuracy).
That is, if soldiers have no information about the peacefully recruiting insurgents, but locate the attacking in-
surgents and avoid collateral damage at least 30% of the time (eectiveness and accuracy both at 0.3), then an
average insurgency lasts more than 4,000 ticks, very long but finite. In contrast, if soldiers obtain intelligence
about the peacefully recruiting insurgents 50% of the time (Figure 8b) and locate the attacking insurgents and
avoid collateral damage 30% of the time, then an average insurgency lasts about 2,000 ticks.14
Figure 9: Duration of insurgency duration by the probability soldiers and insurgents employing the aid strat-
egy. Low accuracy and eectiveness of the military action. Varying probability of insurgent exposure when
insurgents recruit. Scenario (a), on the le: Soldier eectiveness=0.01 to 0.4; soldier accuracy=0.01 to 0.4;
number of recruitable civilians by soldier=1, 5; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.15 to -0.25; number
of recruitable civilians by insurgent=5 to 9; anger change given insurgent recruitment=0.15 to 0.25; probability
insurgent exposed when it recruits, PIEWR =0.0. Scenario (b), on the right: Same, but PIEWR =0.5.
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5.17 Figures 9 and 10 further emphasize the role of intelligence in counterinsurgency. These figures plot insurgency
duration as a function of soldiers’ and rebels’ probability of employing the aid strategy under low levels (Fig-
ure 9) and high levels (Figure 10) of accuracy and eectiveness of soldiers’military action. In Figure 9, the dier-
ence between no detection (9a) and imperfect detection of 50% (9b) of peacefully recruiting rebels is insignifi-
cant. That is, evenwhen soldiers can detect peacefully recruiting rebels 50%of the time, they still cannot target
them eectively and accurately. This dierence is much more pronounced between Figures 10a and 1010b, as
high accuracy and eectiveness of soldiers’ military approach can be further improved by greater detection of
thepeacefully recruiting rebels (note themaximumdurationof insurgencyof only 3,000 ticks in 10b, asopposed
to 5,000 in 10a). Figure 10a shows that there exists a narrow scenario in which even the soldiers that avoid col-
lateral damage and capture insurgents at least 50% of the time cannot prevent an insurgency from becoming
a self-sustaining one. This happens if soldiers obtain no intelligence on peacefully recruiting rebels and rebels
use the aid strategy 90% of the time, implying that only 10% of the time they attack, revealing themselves to
the soldiers.
5.18 Are there any cases when greater reliance on aid is undesirable for counterinsurgents? Themodel further
suggests that – from the viewpoint of soldiers – a well-designed aid strategy is always preferable for accurate
and eective military operations,15 while being futile for the inaccurate and ineective military campaigns.16
Figures 9and 10dier in the soldiers’military action: low levels of accuracy andeectiveness in Figure9 vs. high
levels in Figure 10.17 When soldiersmiss their targets and cause collateral damage 50-90%of the time (shown in
graphs 9a-b), the region of self-sustaining insurgencies is overwhelming (the median duration of insurgency in
Figure9a is 4,918.15 ticks). Evenwhendefeated, the 10th percentiledurationof insurgency inFigure9a is 1,729.56
ticks. Under inaccurate and ineective the military strategy the shorter insurgencies occur when insurgents
recruit at most 10% of the time and soldiers recruit 80-90% of the time. This hypothetical case – albeit unlikely
– underscores the importance of somehow limiting rebel use of the aid strategy when no opportunity to limit
civilian casualties exists.
5.19 In contrast, under an accurate and eective military strategy when soldiers miss their targets and cause collat-
eraldamage less than50%of the time (shown ingraphs 10a-b), rebels rarelyachieveaself-sustaining insurgency
(compared to Figures 9a-b). Under these circumstances, a higher rate of soldiers’ use of aid reduces the average
duration of insurgency.18
5.20 Finally, obtaining any intelligence about rebels’ use of aid is more important for soldiers than obtaining perfect
intelligence. We have also graphed the surfaces in Figures 9 and 10 with soldiers’ ability to detect peacefully
recruiting rebels perfectly, i.e.,PIEWR =1.0 (the graphs are omitted for space). While some intelligencemakes
a big dierence for the accurate and eective soldiers (the dierence between 10a and 10b), perfect intelligence
does not provide as much gain in reducing the duration of insurgency for the state.
Figure 10: Duration of insurgency duration by the probability soldiers and insurgents employing the aid strat-
egy. High accuracy and eectiveness. Varying probability of insurgent exposure when insurgents recruit. Sce-
nario (a), on the le: Soldier eectiveness=0.5 to 0.9; soldier accuracy=0.5 to 0.9; number of recruitable
civilians by soldier=5,9; anger change given soldier recruitment=-0.15,-0.25; number of recruitable civilians
by insurgent=5,9; anger change given insurgent recruitment=0.15,0.25; insurgent exposure when it recruits,
PIEWR =0.0. Scenario (b), on the right: Same, but PIEWR =0.5.
5.21 In summary, a greater reliance on aid only helps soldiers if they avoid collateral damage more than 50% of
the time and obtain at least some intelligence about who the recruiting insurgents are. This conclusion under-
scores how critical the assumption that civilians trade intelligence for aid is (Berman et al. 2011, 2013; Condra &
Shapiro 2012). Table 5.10 and Figures 8, 9, 10 demonstrate that neither side undermines its cause by employ-
ing a (well-designed) aid strategy, yet, soldiers cannot compensate for an ineective and inaccurate military
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action by using peaceful recruitment. The relative weight ofmilitary strategy (compared to aid) is greater when
considering how both COIN strategies aect the duration of insurgency.
Limitations and Future Work
6.1 This work does not exhaust the possible modeling choices with respect to how states and insurgents imple-
ment the aid and military strategies. Future work could consider, for instance, an adaptive value for soldiers’
probability of employing the aid strategy. While we have modeled the government’s strategy to employ aid
programs as an externally given value, we could allow governments to adapt their strategy in response to the
perceived number of insurgents, perceived level of civilian anger, or insurgent strategy. Strategy adaptation
could be applied to the insurgents’ probability of using aid (as opposed to violence) as well.
6.2 There are also fundamentally dierent ways that action sequences could be modelled in a simulation of in-
surgency. For example, the model could be restructured such that instead of one insurgent and one soldier
engaging each tick, all insurgents and all soldiers act in each tick. This modeling choice would ensure that
none of the available soldiers stays unengaged, which could theoretically happen in the current version of the
model, as it is conceivable that a soldier is not randomly picked throughout the entire run. We believe that this
restructuring would have the primary eect of speeding up the simulation as multiple actions have eects at
once; it could also remove the possible eect of sequential activity and path dependence. It is possible that a
similar eect could be obtained in the current sequence by expanding the reach of “media” in the simulation so
that actions have less-localized eects on civilians’ anger and fear. For instance, if civilians in a nearby province
are made aware of either a successful local aid project or of an attack killing civilians, the eects of the action
will spreadmore rapidly.
6.3 We could also explore dierent types of resource constraints on governments. Our model considers the limita-
tion of state resources only to an extent: there are 100 soldiers at all times in ourmodel and if the state employs
the aid strategy 70% of the time, then aer, say, 200 ticks (if insurgency survives until then) on average 70 sol-
diers will have engaged in peaceful recruitment of civilians and 30 soldiers will have employedmilitary action.
The currentmodel represents the tradeo between aid andmilitary action only in the number of soldiers avail-
able and each soldier’s inability to do both actions during the same tick. An alternative representation of a
tradeo that governments face could involve consideration of the cost of aid vs. military action, and the cost of
deploying (soldier) agents to implement those strategies.
Conclusion
7.1 Recent arguments in the counterinsurgency literature suggest the importance of using peaceful aid strategy in
conjunction with, or in place of, the military strategy when seeking to defeat an insurgency. To understand the
relative importance of each strategy and to evaluate the reasonable balance between the aid and military ap-
proaches, we developed a computational model of insurgent and soldier interactions in which both types of
agents can either peacefully recruit civilians or undertakemilitary attacks on the opponent. A series of compu-
tational experiments established four major implications of our model. First, a high-quality military strategy,
i.e., attacking insurgents without harming civilians, is more important for defeating an insurgency than aid.
Second, aid cannot compensate for a low-quality military strategy. Third, investing in obtaining at least some
intelligence is critical for the government; however, the gains in improving from imperfect intelligence to per-
fect intelligence are not as dramatic. Finally, soldiers benefit from a greater reliance on aid only if they can
obtain some intelligence about the insurgents’ aid activity and soldiers avoid collateral damage duringmilitary
engagement at least half the time.
7.2 When it comes to evaluating the best strategies for insurgents, our model suggests that when facing a poorly
trainedarmy, increasing recruitment activities is unnecessary for insurgents, as government troops createmore
rebels than they kill by their inaccurate and ineective attacks. In contrast, when insurgents face a well-trained
military operation, they are better o avoiding attacks altogether. In this case, recruiting civilians in as much
secrecy as possible yields better results for insurgents.
7.3 The first two takeawaysmay be combined into a testable hypothesis: greater amounts of aid provided to those
regionswheremilitary strategyavoidsciviliancasualtiesareexpected tosuppress insurgentattacks. In contrast,
investing in areas where military operations abuse loyal civilians is expected to be counterproductive.
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Appendix: Model Pseudocode
1 . I n su r gen t tu rn
( a ) A random in su r gen t ( l a t e n t or a c t i v e ) i s s e l e c t ed
( b ) The i n su r gen t s e l e c t s ( p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y ) one o f two ac t i on s :
r e c r u i t or a t t a ck
( c ) I f i n su rgen t−s e l e c t ed ac t i on i s a t t a ck :
i . I f a s o l d i e r i s i n range , i n su r gen t a t t a c k s a s o l d i e r :
A . I n su r gen t i s exposed f u l l y
B . The ta rge t ed s o l d i e r coun te r a t t a ck s :
C . I f the s o l d i e r counte ra t tacks , the standard
capture / c o l l a t e r a l damage / update sequence i s
fo l l owed :
− P r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y ( based on e f f e c t i v e n e s s
) , the
i n su r gen t i s k i l l e d and removed from
s imu l a t i on
− I f removed , a new c i v i l i a n i s added to
the s imu l a t i on at a random l o c a t i o n and
with random c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
− P r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y ( based on accuracy ) ,
c i v i l i a n s sur round ing the i n su r gen t are
wounded
− Anger and f e a r i s updated f o r c i v i l i a n s
who were wounded
− Because the s o l d i e r coun te ra t t a ck was a
response to an insu rgen t , anger
i n c r e a s e s moderate ly
( d ) I f i n su rgen t−s e l e c t ed ac t i on i s r e c r u i t :
i . I f any c i v i l i a n i s i n range , i n su r gen t r e c r u i t s one
or more c i v i l i a n s , up to a number s p e c i f i e d i n a model
parameter
A . I n su r gen t i s exposed with a c e r t a i n
p r o b a b i l i t y ( s p e c i f i e d by the parameter P (
I n su r gen t Exposed Given i t R e c r u i t s )
B . Rec ru i t ed c i v i l i a n s expe r i ence a moderate
anger i n c r e a s e
C . I f the i n su r gen t i s exposed , nearby
s o l d i e r s can make a coun te ra t t a ck / ‘ ‘ a t t a ck o f
oppor tun i ty ’ ’ on i n su r g en t s ( responding with
s o l d i e r ’ s response p r obab i l i t y , c u r r e n t l y 1 . 0 )
− Given a counte ra t tack , the standard
capture / c o l l a t e r a l damage / update
sequence i s fo l l owed
− Because the s o l d i e r coun te ra t t a ck was a
response to an insu rgen t , anger
i n c r e a s e s moderate ly
2 . S o l d i e r tu rn
( a ) A random s o l d i e r i s s e l e c t ed
( b ) The s o l d i e r s e l e c t s ( p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y ) one o f two ac t i on s :
r e c r u i t or a t t a ck
( c ) I f s o l d i e r−s e l e c t ed ac t i on i s a t t a ck :
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i . I f t he re i s an exposed i n su r gen t i n t h e i r
neighborhood , s o l d i e r p reempt i ve l y t a r g e t s an exposed
i n su r gen t
A . Given the at tack , the standard capture /
c o l l a t e r a l damage / update sequence i s fo l l owed
B . Because the s o l d i e r coun te ra t t a ck was not
i n response to an insu rgen t , anger i n c r e a s e s at
a h ighe r r a t e
( d ) I f s o l d i e r−s e l e c t ed ac t i on i s to r e c r u i t ( by doing good
works i n the neighborhood )
i . I f t he re i s a c i v i l i a n i n the s o l d i e r ’ s
neighborhood , i t may be r e c r u i t ed , up to a number
s p e c i f i e d in a model parameter
A . Rec ru i t ed c i v i l i a n s expe r i ence an anger decrease
B . No worry about c o l l a t e r a l damage
3 . Repeat from step 1 u n t i l no l a t e n t or a c t i v e i n su r g en t s remain , or 5000
t i c k s are reached .
Notes
1Our focus on these strategies does not deny that many scholars have investigated the importance of mul-
tiple other factors in influencing the course of an insurgency or civil war. E.g., we could consider (i) the absence
of diicult terrain and the absence of natural resources that could fund a rebel organization (Collier & Hoeler
2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Ross 2004), and (ii) ethnic sorting and cleansing (Agnew et al. 2008; Weidmann &
Salehyan 2013). Our simulation ignores these other independent factors for themoment; it could be expanded
in the future if we would expect these factors to confound our results.
2Themost interesting dynamic of Bennett’s (2008)model emerges at low rates of soldiers capturing targets,
which could approximate situations of soldiers having no intelligence about who the individual insurgents are
in the population. For instance, in a scenario of soldiers capturing targets 10% of the time, militaries can never
defeat an insurgency if they avoid collateral damage 30% of the time or less, while gains in avoiding collateral
damage beyond 50% of the time will generate dramatic reductions in insurgency duration (Bennett 2008, 1.6).
This eect is replicated in Figure 6.
3Other common labels include “enemy-centric” (Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012) or “hard-power”
(Rineheart 2010).
4For instance, see Kocher et al. (2011); Condra et al. (2010); Benmelech et al. (2015). However, see Lyall (2009)
and Johnston & Sarbahi (2016) for divergent findings.
5An important caveat to these findings is that empirically, aid disbursements in Iraq seemed to suppress
insurgent attacks only in those areas that a government controls, while actually increasing insurgent attacks in
areas of split control (Sexton 2016). Since government / insurgent control over territory is an emergent charac-
teristic of our model, we cannot directly compare the underpinnings of our model to Sexton’s (2016) findings.
However, our model’s result that the military approach is important at defeating insurgency is consistent with
Sexton’s (2016) findings: first, soldiers need to secure an area, then, work on increasing support for the govern-
ment.
6The simulation was programmed in Java.
7While onemight thinkof plausible alternative distributions for initial fear, initial anger, and violence thresh-
old in the population, in this version, we follow Bennett’s (2008) default values for these parameters to make
comparisons with the baseline model more straightforward.
8While we do not separate these activities (e.g. protest vs. quiet action) explicitly, a future version of the
model could expand the action set, or by focusing on additional subsets of civilians, like those whose anger is
greater than fear, yet the violence threshold has not beenmet.
9The precise means by which a soldier attacks an insurgent (or vice-versa) is le undefined in the model, it
is possible that an actor could be using somemethod of violence that is not face-to-face.
10We also analyzed additional emergent features of the simulation, notably speed of growth (measured as
the time until 25% of the population become latent insurgents), peak number of latent insurgents, and peak
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number of active insurgents. Analyses of these features support the same conclusions as presented here. For
details, see Figures 9a through 12b and Table 1 of the web appendix.
11The figure parallels Bennett’s (2008) results. See Figure 9 in Bennett (2008), as all of the results presented
in this paper are the runs with replacement and no neighborhood influence.
12This samepoint is illustrated ingreaterdetail by a seriesof 2Dgraphs in thewebappendix. CompareFigures
1a-4b and Figures 5a-8b.
13Also, refer to Figures 13 (p. 32) and 2a-2b (p. 4–5) and a note on a narrowly constructed scenario of when
the aid strategy may compensate for an incompetent military strategy (p. 31) of the web appendix.
14Figures 3a and 3b in the web appendix (pp. 6–7) communicate this point in greater detail through a series
of 2D graphs.
15The exception being a scenario in which the insurgents recruit 90% of the time and there is no exposure of
the recruiting insurgents (see Figure 7a).
16The exception being a scenario in which insurgents do not recruit at all (see Figure 4b).
17Across all levels of aid quality in Table 5.10, Figure 6 approximates the average between the columns “low”
and “medium” quality of the military approach and Figure 7 approximates the average between the columns
“medium” and “high” quality of themilitary approach in Table 5.10. Figures 5a-8b of the web appendix (pp. 10–
17) communicate these same takeaways in finer detail in a series of 2D graphs.
18A narrow exception is discussed in the previous subsection.
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